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Abstract 
 
The pƌoďleŵ of ͚oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe͛, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ͚tƌaŶsŶatioŶal oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe͛, has ďeĐoŵe a 
prominent issue in international affairs over the past two decades, as exemplified in the 
UŶited NatioŶs͛ CoŶǀeŶtioŶ AgaiŶst TƌaŶsŶatioŶal OƌgaŶised Cƌiŵe aŶd the EuƌopeaŶ 
UŶioŶ͛s ageŶda foƌ ĐƌeatiŶg aŶ ͚Aƌea of Fƌeedoŵ, “eĐuƌitǇ aŶd JustiĐe͛ ;AF“JͿ aŵoŶgst its 
member states. These official constructions of the problem identify threats to public safety 
resulting from the greater mobility of people and goods across national borders and the 
eǆploitatioŶ of this ŵoďilitǇ ďǇ ͚oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe gƌoups͛ ;OCGsͿ.  IŶ tuƌŶ, this has led to the 
generation of a new genre of policy-orieŶted leaƌŶiŶg, the ͚thƌeat assessŵeŶt͛, epitomised 
ďǇ the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ͛s OƌgaŶised Cƌiŵe Thƌeat AssessŵeŶts ;ϮϬϬϲ-2011) and its Serious 
and Organised Threat Assessment (2013-2017), which informs and legitimises the cross-
border targeting and co-ordination of preventive interventions against such groups. 
Advocates of threat assessment argue it provides a rational means of anticipating and 
reducing harms to public safety. Critics argue it lacks any defensible methodology and is 
open to abuse, providing post-hoc rationalisations for prejudicial action against outsiders. 
Conversely, an emerging programme of research switches analysis from OCGs to the modus 
operandi of commissioning serious crimes, that is, from a focus on criminal actors to crime 
scripts and theiƌ faĐilitatiŶg ĐoŶditioŶs oƌ ͚sĐeŶes͛. IŶ tuƌŶ, these ĐoŶĐepts ĐaŶ ďe used iŶ 
thought eǆpeƌiŵeŶts ideŶtifǇiŶg ͚sĐeŶaƌios͛ foƌ the pƌospeĐtiǀe performance of serious 
crimes. These offer less certain but less bigoted and more satisficing grounds for anticipating 
serious crimes for the purposes of public protection. These key trends in policy discourse are 
reviewed in order to question how we can know about transnational organised crime and 
act on the strategic dilemmas of prejudice and protection in anticipatory forms of 
governing. 
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1 This is a revised and updated version of a paper originally published in the proceedings of the RiskMonitor 
Foundation͛s conference on Organized Crime, Civil Society and the Policy Process, 28-30th May 2010 (Edwards, 
2011). 
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The problem of organized crime is the concept of organized crime itself, which in turn 
pƌoduĐes the ǁƌoŶg ƋuestioŶ foƌ ƌeseaƌĐh, ǁhiĐh is to ask if ͞it͟ is oƌgaŶized iŶ a paƌtiĐulaƌ 
way, whereas the more sensible question is to ask what factors over time shape the ways in 
which crimes of certain types are organized and who [beyond just the perpetrators] gets 
involved in them? (Edwards and Levi, 2008: 373).  
 
Introduction 
 ͚OƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe͛ is Ŷoǁ a ŵajoƌ foĐus foƌ puďliĐ poliĐǇ, as eǆeŵplified iŶ the UŶited 
NatioŶs͛ CoŶǀeŶtioŶ AgaiŶst TƌaŶsŶatioŶal OƌgaŶised Cƌiŵe ;UNODC ϮϬϬϰ; Edǁaƌds aŶ Gill, 
ϮϬϬϯͿ aŶd, iŶ Euƌope, its pƌoŵiŶeŶĐe oŶ the EU͛s ageŶda foƌ ĐƌeatiŶg aŶ ͚Aƌea of Freedom, 
“eĐuƌitǇ aŶd JustiĐe͛ ;Taŵpeƌe Pƌogƌaŵŵe, ϭϵϵϵ; Hague Pƌogƌaŵŵe, ϮϬϬ4; Stockholm 
Programme, 2010). In turn, this agenda has generated a whole new genre of policy-oriented 
leaƌŶiŶg, the ͚thƌeat assessŵeŶt͛ of oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe ǁhiĐh eŶdeaǀouƌs to pƌovide policy-
makers with an understanding of current organised crime patterns, in particular concerns 
aďout ͚tƌaŶsŶatioŶal͛ Đƌiŵes ƌesultiŶg fƌoŵ the gƌeateƌ ŵoďilitǇ of people aŶd goods aĐƌoss 
borders, and to inform the targeting and co-ordination of efforts at prevention (EU OCTA, 
2006 and passim; EU SOCTA, 2013; EU iOCTA, 2014). In the social science research 
community, however, the very concept of organised crime remains controversial. Some 
consider it to be little more than a political construct, used by policy elites in the liberal 
deŵoĐƌaĐies to depiĐt theŵselǀes as pƌiŵaƌilǇ the ǀiĐtiŵs of ͚alieŶ͛ thƌeats fƌoŵ a faŵiliaƌ 
ƌogues͛ galleƌǇ of oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe gƌoups ;OCG͛sͿ: ͚Cosa Nostƌa͛, ͚ColuŵďiaŶ Caƌtels͛, 
͚ChiŶese Tƌiads͛, ͚‘ussiaŶ MafiǇa͛ etĐ. ;Woodiwiss, 2003; Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009). 
Others identify a self-referential bureaucratic politics at play in the construction of 
organised crime threats as problems of law enforcement implying law enforcement 
solutions, including innovations in confiscating the proceeds of crime (Sheptycki, 2003; van 
Duyne and Vander Beken, 2009). 
 
Counterpoised to the threat assessment industry and its sceptics, however, is an emerging 
field of research which focuses analysis on the organisation of serious crimes, including the 
opportunities for their commission and the social relations which these imply (Edwards and 
Levi, 2008). This analytical shift has generated an energetic research programme concerned 
ǁith the ͚Đƌiŵe sĐƌipts͛ oƌ modus operandi employed by criminal organisations to 
commission different types of crime (Cornish and Clarke, 2002; Levi and Maguire, 2004), the 
͚sĐeŶaƌios͛ ǁhiĐh aƌe ŵoƌe oƌ less ĐoŶduĐiǀe to the oƌgaŶisatioŶ of these Đƌiŵes ;VaŶdeƌ 
Beken and Verfaillie, 2010), the normative, as well as empiriĐal, iŶƋuiƌǇ iŶto the ͚soĐial 
haƌŵs͛ that ƋualifǇ ĐeƌtaiŶ tǇpes of Đƌiŵe as ͚seƌious͛ pƌioƌities foƌ goǀeƌŶŵeŶtal aĐtioŶ 
(Greenfield and Paoli, 2010) aŶd the ĐoŶditioŶs oƌ ͚sĐeŶes͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh these sĐƌipts aƌe plaǇed 
out.  
 
This analytical shift has had an impact on policy trends, partly influencing the European 
CouŶĐil͛s ϮϬϬϲ deĐisioŶ oŶ the ƌeŵit of Euƌopol ;the EuƌopeaŶ PoliĐiŶg ageŶĐǇͿ to shift the 
sĐope of its ǁoƌk fƌoŵ ͚oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe͛ to ͚seƌious Đƌiŵe͛ ;DoƌŶ, ϮϬϬϴͿ. The primary 
location of this shift in thinking has, however, been in the academy and its pressure on 
policy-makers, as in the ‘oǇal UŶited “eƌǀiĐes IŶstitute͛s pƌogƌaŵŵe of ƌeseaƌĐh oŶ 
organised crime (RUSI, 2013). To place this trend in context and as a precursor to discussing 
its implications for the policy-research relationship, it is possible to distinguish three other 
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dominant policy trends, each with their own distinctive analytical focus. Table 1 summarises 
a basic dichotomy in policy trends between varieties of actor-oriented thinking on the one 
hand and a focus on organisational, commissioning, processes on the other. 
 
Table 1. Organised Crime Policy Trends and Their Analytical Focus 
 
 
Trend 
 
Analytical Focus 
 
Policy Exemplars 
 
The Actor-Orientation (1): 
Conspirators 
 
Organised Crime 
Groups (OCGs)  
Kefauver Committee (1950); 
US Presidential Commissions on 
OC (1967, 1986); RICO statute 
(1970) 
 
The Actor-Orientation (2): 
Illegal Entrepreneurs 
 
Illicit networks 
 
German BKA\LKA definition of OC 
(1986) 
 
The Actor-Orientation (3): 
Poly-Criminals 
 
͚Potpouƌƌi͛ of ͚thƌeat 
iŶdiĐatoƌs͛:  OCGs  SOCs (Serious 
Organised Crime 
areas)  CRFs (Crime 
Relevant Factors)  Effects of OCGs + 
SOCs on EU society 
UN Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime 
(2000); 
Annual EU Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment (2006-2011); 
EU Serious and Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment (2013 – 2017) 
 
Organisation of Serious 
Crimes: Commissioning 
Scripts, Scenes and 
Scenarios 
Approach still marginal to the 
actor-orientation and primarily 
based in the academy and its 
advice to policy-makers, e.g. RUSI 
(Royal United Services Institute) 
Organised Crime Programme 
(2013+) 
 
 
Policy Trends and their Research Implications 
All of these trends continue to attract support and compete for prioritisation on policy 
agendas and research programmes. To draw upon a musical metaphor, we can refer to 
them as refrains to suggest that whilst they have been coterminous for much of the history 
of ͚oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe͛ as a pƌoďleŵ foƌ puďliĐ poliĐǇ, soŵe haǀe ďeeŶ loudeƌ thaŶ otheƌs at 
certain times and in certain contexts. This metaphor helps us understand the contentious 
quality of this policy issue and the particular cacophony of current policy debate.  As 
indicated in Table 1., it is possible to differentiate key policy trends in terms of the particular 
aŶalǇtiĐal foĐus theǇ pƌiǀilege aŶd hoǁ this leads to the pƌoďleŵ ďeiŶg ͚fƌaŵed͛ iŶ ǁaǇs that 
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prioritise certain kinds of actors, activities and contexts for policy responses, whilst down-
playing others. 
 
The Actor-Orientation (1): Conspirators 
Histoƌies of the defiŶitioŶ of ͚oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe͛ as aŶ offiĐial ĐategoƌǇ aŶd foĐus foƌ poliĐǇ 
identify its origins in American law enforcement (Woodiwiss, 2003). One of the earliest uses 
of the concept has been traced back to the 1896 report of the New York Society for the 
Prevention of Crime into racketeering, gambling and prostitution. Both here, and in the US 
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the Wickersham Commission, 
1929-31), the problem is defined in terms of the political and economic conditions 
generating racketeering, including the corruption and collusion of public officials in 
municipal government (ibid.; Smith, 1991). Post-Second World War, however, historians 
identify a ŵajoƌ shift iŶ poliĐǇ disĐouƌse. ͚What͛ Ƌuestions about the kinds of crime that 
were being organised and how they were organised became less important than questions 
aďout ͚ǁho͛ ǁas doiŶg the oƌgaŶisiŶg, iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aďout the iŶflueŶĐe of foƌeigŶ 
career criminals (Smith, 1991). Critics of this analytical shift refer to the new concept of 
oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe as aŶ ͚alieŶ ĐoŶspiƌaĐǇ theoƌǇ͛, epitoŵised ďǇ the pƌoĐeediŶgs of the ϭϵϱϬ 
Kefauǀeƌ “eŶate IŶǀestigatiŶg Coŵŵittee ;oŶ ͚oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe iŶ iŶteƌstate ĐoŵŵeƌĐe͛Ϳ 
which was preoccupied with the organisation of criminal conspiracies around ethnic groups, 
in particular those emanating from the Italian-American community. In contrast to the 
earlier Wickersham Commission, the Kefauver Committee was conspicuously silent about 
the role of officialdom in the facilitation of criminal enterprises; the now familiar distinction 
ďetǁeeŶ the ͚uppeƌ-ǁoƌld͛ of legitiŵate ĐoŵŵeƌĐe aŶd goǀeƌŶŵeŶt aŶd the ͚uŶdeƌ-ǁoƌld͛ 
of criminal conspiracies had become enshrined in public policy (Paoli and Fijnaut, 2004).  
 
The Kefauǀeƌ Coŵŵittee populaƌised the idea of, ͚a ŶatioŶǁide Đƌiŵe sǇŶdiĐate kŶoǁŶ as 
the Mafia, ǁhose teŶtaĐles aƌe fouŶd iŶ ŵaŶǇ laƌge Đities͛ ;UŶited “tates “eŶate, ϭϵϱϭ: ϭϯϭͿ. 
Mafia imagery subsequently dominated policy discourse in the US, compounded by the 
notorious testimony of Joe Valacchi given in 1963 to the US Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, in which he discussed his participation in an Italian-
AŵeƌiĐaŶ Đƌiŵe sǇŶdiĐate, ͚La Cosa Nostƌa͛. The ĐoŶĐept of oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe as the 
consequence of ethnically-based syndicates with international connections was given 
aĐadeŵiĐ ĐƌediďilitǇ thƌough DoŶald CƌesseǇ͛s ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to LǇŶdoŶ JohŶsoŶ͛s ϭϵϲϳ 
PƌesideŶtial Task FoƌĐe oŶ OƌgaŶised Cƌiŵe. CƌesseǇ͛s ;ϭϵϲϵͿ laŶdŵaƌk teǆt, Theft of a 
Nation, represented organised crime in the US as a shadow state, mirror-imaging, the 
hierarchically organised rational bureaucracies of the law enforcement agencies charged 
with tackliŶg ͚it͛.   
 
These core aspects of the Cressey model also clarify the purposes of the principal law 
enforcement instrument that came out of the Johnson Task Force, the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupted Organisations (RICO) statute of 1970, to prosecute membership of criminal 
enterprises involved in predicate offences. The analytical preoccupation with organised 
crime groups (OCGs) ƌeĐeiǀed a ͚pluƌalist͛ ƌeǀisioŶ iŶ ‘oŶald ‘eagaŶ͛s PƌesideŶtial 
Commission on Organised Crime, which retained a focus on the threat posed by ethnically-
based conspiracies but broadened the scope beyond the Mafia to accommodate the 
peƌĐeiǀed iŵpaĐt of ͚ColoŵďiaŶ Caƌtels͛, the JapaŶese Yakuza aŶd ‘ussiaŶ gƌoups etĐ. 
(Potter, 1994).  
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The lineage of the alien conspiracy theory continues through to present representations of 
͚tƌaŶsŶatioŶal͛ oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe iŶ other regions, particularly in Europe post-Soviet Union, 
aŶd ĐaŶ ďe disĐeƌŶed iŶ the EU͛s thƌeat assessŵeŶts ;see ďeloǁͿ. WithiŶ the AŵeƌiĐaŶ 
͚hoŵe͛ of the ĐoŶĐept of oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe, hoǁeǀeƌ, this theoƌǇ has ďeeŶ ĐhalleŶged ďǇ 
those arguing that much illegal market activity, particularly in the narcotics markets, 
opeƌates iŶ a ͚disoƌgaŶised ǁaǇ͛ aŶd is ďetteƌ ĐoŶĐeptualised iŶ teƌŵs of ŵaƌketplaĐe 
dynamics (Reuter, 1983; Naylor, 1997).  
 
The Actor-Orientation (2): Illegal Entrepreneurs 
Conceptualising organised crime in terms of illicit enterprise has also been a defining 
characteristic of much European policy activity in relation to organised crime, as epitomised 
by the definition offered by the German Bundeskriminalamt in 1983:  
 
͚OƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe constitutes the planned commission of criminal 
offences driven by the quest for acquiring profits or powers. Such 
criminal offences have to be, individually or in their entirety, of major 
significance and involve the cooperation of more than two 
participants acting with a common intent for a longer or indefinite 
period of time on a distributed-task basis: 
 
 a) by utilisation of commercial or business-like structures 
b) by application of violence or other methods suitable for achieving 
intimidation or 
c) by exerting influence on politics, the media, public administrations, 
justiĐe systeŵs, oƌ ĐoŵŵeƌĐe aŶd iŶdustƌy.͛ 
   
The analytical concern with enterprise has the advantage of shifting policy change and 
learning away from the blunt, ethnocentric and potentially bigoted, focus on ethnically-
defined groups (without denying that ethnicity and kinship can be employed as resources 
for organising serious crimes, see below). It accommodates looser partnerships of co-
offenders and consequently acknowledges the phenomenon of project crimes arranged by 
Ŷetǁoƌks of illiĐit eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌs ďƌought togetheƌ ďǇ ͚ĐƌiŵiŶal ĐoŶtaĐt ďƌokeƌs͛ foƌ the 
purposes of commissioning particular offences (Hobbs, 2001; Klerks, 2003). The use of social 
network analysis to conceptualise and explain such project crimes has become a key focus 
of academic research, for example on human trafficking (Campana, 2015) or gun crime 
(Oatley and Crick, 2015). 
 
Even so, analysis of the structural properties of organised crime problems, in particular their 
accomplishment through social networks of entrepreneurs, still privileges a focus on 
particular co-offenders rather than the assemblage of these actors and the necessary 
resources for organising serious crimes in conditions that are conducive. As a consequence, 
there is a danger of repeating the reductionist explanation of conspiracy theorists only this 
tiŵe ƌeduĐiŶg the poliĐǇ pƌoďleŵ to the stƌuĐtuƌal pƌopeƌties of ͚the Ŷetǁoƌk͛ of 
eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌs ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚the sǇŶdiĐate͛ of alieŶ ĐoŶspiƌatoƌs.  
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In addition, the looser definition of organised crime as illicit entrepreneurship has attracted 
criticism for simply adding to the ambivalence of a policy construction that accommodates 
activities ranging from tax fraud through to drugs trafficking and terrorist activity and actors 
as diverse as the Italian Cosa Nostra through to youth gangs (Fijnaut, et al, 1998). Paoli and 
Fijnaut (2004: 41) conclude their history of the concept of organised crime by arguing: 
 
 Its very plurality of meanings, explaining its recent success in world public debate, 
and making it a catchy label to signify popular anxieties and foster legislative 
changes, hinders the full transformation of organised crime into a clear-cut legal 
category. Despite the definitional efforts made by several domestic governments and 
international organisations, organised crime is still far from meeting the normative 
characteristics of legal categories and its definitions usually lack both rigorousness 
and exhaustiveness. It remains a vague and ambiguous catchphrase, the application 
of which inevitably entails varying – but usually high – degrees of arbitrariness. 
 
The Actor-Orientation (3): Poly-Criminals 
One response to this definitional problem has been to replace the search for an all-
encompassing definition with evolving content definitions of emerging threats and risks. 
This appƌoaĐh ĐaŶ ďe disĐeƌŶed iŶ the UŶited NatioŶ͛s CoŶǀeŶtioŶ AgaiŶst TƌaŶsŶatioŶal 
Organised Crime and, more explicitly still, in the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ͛s aŶŶual OƌgaŶised Cƌiŵe 
Threat Assessments ;the ͚OCTA͛Ϳ, which commenced in 2006 and concluded in 2011 before 
being replaced by the current EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (the 
͚“OCTA͛Ϳ, fiƌst puďlished iŶ ϮϬϭϯ ĐoǀeƌiŶg the ϮϬϭϯ – ϮϬϭϳ peƌiod ǁith aŶ ͚iŶteƌiŵ 
assessŵeŶt͛ eǆpeĐted iŶ ϮϬϭϱ2.  
 
Reviewing the journey from OCTA to SOCTA provides a means of tracing the evolution of 
thinking about organised crime in elite European policy-making circles over the past decade 
and, within this thinking, the particular importance of the threat assessment as a new genre 
of policy-making provoked. The replacement of the EU Organised Crime Situation Reports 
(OCSR) by the OCTA in 2006 was justified on the grounds that transnational OCGs were 
outwitting and outflanking the capacities of national police and intelligence agencies and 
this warranted both a transnational response from European-wide agencies such as Europol 
and one that aimed to anticipate and pre-empt, not simply react to, problems of 
transnational organised crime. In these terms the ambition of the OCTA was to inform the 
anticipatory governance of transnational organised crime problems and to justify pre-
emptive interventions. As such it is a sigŶifiĐaŶt shift iŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶtalitǇ fƌoŵ ͚ĐƌiŵiŶal 
justiĐe͛, the ƌetƌospeĐtiǀe deteĐtioŶ aŶd pƌoseĐutioŶ of suspeĐts ͚oŶ the faĐts͛ of offeŶĐes 
alƌeadǇ Đoŵŵitted, to ͚seĐuƌitǇ͛ aŶd the justification of pre-emptive interventions against 
suspects yet to offend. Given the gravity of this shift foƌ ͚the politiĐs aŶd jurisprudence of 
gƌoup offeŶdiŶg͛ it is worth reflecting on developments in threat assessment and the fitness 
for purpose of this policy genre in warranting pre-emptive intervention. 
 
Whilst adding to the range of factors considered in threat assessments, this policy trend has 
continued the tendency in other actor-oriented accounts to treat organised crime as a 
collective noun, a singular thing, rather than a variegated process. As a consequence, more 
                                                          
2 Unreleased at the time of writing this paper. 
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elaďoƌate ĐoŶteŶt defiŶitioŶs of this thiŶg haǀe oŶlǇ ƌesulted iŶ a ͚potpouƌƌi͛ of faĐtoƌs to be 
considered rather than their assemblage into something that realist social scientists would 
recognise as resembling an explanation with a clear explanandum and related explanans 
(Keat and Urry, 1981: 10, 248-9).  
 
Admittedly there is the privilege in the philosophy of social science of treating the very 
possibility of assembling explanations as an ongoing contentious issue of epistemology 
amongst realists and interpretativists (Sayer, 2000).  However the absence of clear 
explanatory thinking in the policy process for security strategies premised on pre-emptive 
intervention ought to provoke considerable concern. It would be disconcerting enough if, in 
Paoli aŶd FijŶaut͛s teƌŵs, poliĐǇ-oriented learning about retrospective law enforcement 
ĐoŶtiŶued to ďe ͚aƌďitƌaƌǇ͛ but in the context of legitimating the prejudice of security 
strategies it is surely indefensible. If the building of predictive machines to warrant pre-
emptive intervention is to remain a possible and desirable policy goal then the methodology 
of threat assessment is justifiably a core concern for any interested in the politics and 
jurisprudence of group offending.  
 
From OCTA to SOCTA 
The journey from OCTA to SOCTA can be characterised as one in which actors, the OCGs, 
remain central but are represented as ŵoƌe sophistiĐated ͚polǇ-ĐƌiŵiŶals͛ iŶ that theǇ 
diversify into a range of criminal activities that can complement one another, such as 
trafficking in people as well as narcotics and enabling illegal migration as well as shipping 
forced labour into the vice markets and sweatshops of Western Europe. Table 2., provides a 
summary of the key indices of risk referred to in the first OCTA. 
 
This first threat assessment argued that whilst the Organised Crime Situation Reports 
;OC“‘Ϳ that pƌeĐeded the OCTA, pƌoǀided a desĐƌiptiǀe aĐĐouŶt, the OCTA, ͚puts aŶ 
emphasis on the qualitative assessment of this complex and multi-faĐeted pheŶoŵeŶoŶ͛, 
noting: 
 
There is a need for a close attention on key criminals, their networks, the financial 
dimension of the OC groups and their ability to communicate within and between 
one another. That is, the functional side of OC must be at the forefront of the 
attention, asking the question what they are doing and how, rather than who they 
are (OCTA, 2006: 6). 
 
IŶ these teƌŵs the OCTA ƌeĐogŶizes diffeƌeŶt kiŶds of oƌgaŶised gƌoups, iŶĐludiŶg ͚fleǆiďle 
and fluid patterns of association between individual ĐƌiŵiŶals͛ aŶd eŵphasises the 
iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg, ͚the ĐoŶditioŶs uŶdeƌ ǁhiĐh patteƌŶs of ĐƌiŵiŶal assoĐiatioŶ 
and co-offeŶdiŶg eŵeƌge aŶd eǆist͛ ;OCTA, ϮϬϬϲ: ϭϮͿ. ‘efeƌeŶĐe is also ŵade to the 
principal activities of these groups, specifically drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings 
and illegal immigration, fraud, Euro counterfeiting, commodity counterfeiting and 
intellectual property theft, and money laundering. The OCTA (2006: 17-22) also identifies 
͚keǇ faĐilitatiŶg faĐtoƌs ǁith ƌegaƌds to ĐƌiŵiŶal ŵaƌkets͛, ǁhiĐh pƌoǀide OCGs ǁith 
opportunities for commissioning serious crimes, including document forgery and identify 
theft, misuse of the transport sector, exploitation of the financial sector, problems of 
globalisation and ease of movement across borders. 
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Table 2. OCTA Threat Assessment Indicators, Categories and Patterns  
 
 
Key Indicators of OCGs 
 
 
Categories of OCGs 
 
Regional Patterns of OCGs 
 The IŶteƌŶatioŶal 
DiŵeŶsioŶ: ŵeaŶiŶg, 
͚iŶteƌŶatioŶal Đo-
opeƌatioŶ, 
 
• OC Gƌoup “tƌuĐtuƌes: 
patteƌŶs of ĐƌiŵiŶal 
assoĐiatioŶ aŶd Đo-
offeŶdiŶg, 
 
• Use of Legitiŵate 
BusiŶess “tƌuĐtuƌes 
 
• “peĐializatioŶ: pƌoǀidiŶg 
oƌ ƌeĐƌuitiŶg aĐtoƌs ǁith 
speĐialist skills  
 
• IŶflueŶĐe aŶd 
CoƌƌuptioŶ: ŵisusiŶg 
eŶtƌusted poǁeƌ foƌ 
pƌiǀate gaiŶ; 
 
• VioleŶĐe; 
 
• CouŶteƌ-ŵeasuƌes: 
uŶdeƌtakeŶ ďǇ OC gƌoups 
to aǀoid deteĐtioŶ aŶd 
pƌoseĐutioŶ. 
 
 TeƌƌitoƌiallǇ ďased, 
iŶdigeŶous OCGs, ǁith 
eǆteŶsiǀe tƌaŶsŶatioŶal 
aĐtiǀities;  
 
• MaiŶlǇ ethŶiĐallǇ 
hoŵogeŶous gƌoups ǁith 
theiƌ leadeƌship aŶd ŵaiŶ 
assets aďƌoad; 
 
• DǇŶaŵiĐ Ŷetǁoƌks of 
peƌpetƌatoƌs; 
  
• OCGs ďased oŶ stƌiĐtlǇ 
defiŶed oƌgaŶizatioŶal 
pƌiŶĐiples ǁithout aŶ 
ethŶiĐ ĐoŵpoŶeŶt, 
Đoupled ǁith a laƌge 
iŶteƌŶatioŶal pƌeseŶĐe. 
• The south-easteƌŶ ƌegioŶ 
of the EU, ǁith a foĐus oŶ 
Tuƌkish aŶd AlďaŶiaŶ 
OCGs; 
 
• The south-ǁesteƌŶ 
ƌegioŶ of the EU, ǁith a 
foĐus oŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ AfƌiĐaŶ 
OCGs; 
 
• The Ŷoƌth-easteƌŶ ƌegioŶ 
of the EU, foĐusiŶg oŶ the 
BaltiĐ “tates aŶd the 
iŶflueŶĐe of ‘ussiaŶ 
speakiŶg OCGs; 
 
• The AtlaŶtiĐ ƌegioŶ, 
ƌeǀolǀiŶg ŵaiŶlǇ aƌouŶd 
the piǀotal tƌaŶsŶatioŶal 
ƌole of DutĐh, Bƌitish aŶd 
BelgiaŶ OCGs. 
Source: European Union Organised Crime Threat Assessment, 2006 (OCTA, 2006: 11-17, 24). 
 
Even so, the assessment proceeds from an identification of OC actors to their activities and 
their consequences, rather than taking the accomplishment of particular criminalized 
activities as the analytical focus, in which the mobilization of different actors is but one part. 
The admixture of the indicators, categories, regional patterns, principal activities and 
facilitating factors used to define the threats posed by organised crime groups has been 
criticised for producing a confused analytical tool. As van Duyne and Vander Beken (2009: 
274) argue: 
 
On the one hand, [the OCTA] seems a threat assessment when it tries to make 
statements about organised crime groups and criminal markets. On the other hand, 
it carries elements of an impact assessment since the evaluation of the level of threat 
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is sometimes directly connected to its impact on society. Moreover, the analysis of 
key facilitating factors (like the misuse of the road transport sector) contains 
elements of a vulnerability study. 
 
Mindful of the confused picture emerging out of the OCTA, the first assessment notes that, 
͚WeightiŶg Đƌiŵe aƌeas agaiŶst oŶe aŶotheƌ is iŶheƌeŶtlǇ diffiĐult. This too, has less to do 
with analytical insights than value statements, reflecting different priorities in the MS 
[Meŵďeƌ “tates of the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ] aŶd ďeǇoŶd͛ ;ϮϬϬϲ: ϮϱͿ. It is aĐkŶoǁledged that, 
ultiŵatelǇ, the iŶtelligeŶĐe oŶ ǁhiĐh the OCTA is pƌeŵised is gleaŶed fƌoŵ, ͚Ǉeaƌs of 
politiĐal aŶd laǁ eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt eǆpeƌieŶĐe͛ ;ϮϬϬϲ: ϮϲͿ, a depeŶdeŶĐe that is reinforced by 
the keǇ ŵethodologiĐal iŶstƌuŵeŶt of thƌeat assessŵeŶts; suƌǀeǇs of poliĐe foƌĐes͛ 
perceptions of organised crime activity (Gregory, 2003; van Duyne and Vander Beken, 
2009). 
 
Without wishing to dismiss the relevance of political and law enforcement-based 
assessments of threat, there is a danger that these bracket-off other kinds of expertise 
about organised crime. This has at least three possible ramifications (Edwards and Levi, 
2008: 372-4): 
 
1. Without reference to countervailing analyses, threat assessments run the risk of 
becoming self-referential, recycling the prevailing values and priorities (the 
categories and frames of reference) of the political and law enforcement agencies 
who are surveyed for the purposes of composing the threat assessments; 
2. Privileging law enforcement intelligence presupposes law enforcement responses, 
even whilst the very limitations of law enforcement as a crime reduction strategy are 
recognised. Consequently, the first OCTA states both that the international scope of 
OCG activities and their infiltration of the upper-world of government and 
ĐoŵŵeƌĐe, ͚giǀes theŵ a soƌt of iŵpuŶitǇ aŶd peƌpetuitǇ that ĐouŶteƌaĐts laǁ 
eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt effoƌts͛, ďut it ŶoŶetheless asseƌts that, ͚ǁheŶ attaĐkiŶg OC, laǁ 
enforcement is at the heaƌt of politiĐal aŶd eĐoŶoŵiĐ life iŶ the EU.͛ ;OCTA, ϮϬϬϲ: ϱ, 
23); and 
3. The failure to switch the analytical focus from the prosecution of actors, OCGs, to 
the organisation of serious crimes inhibits the transformation of strategic priorities 
(such as sustainable crime reduction) into detailed operational recommendations. 
 
Whilst cataloguing OCG actors and activities, threat assessments remain very obtuse and 
abstract about the explanation of organised crime problems and consequently how 
remediable they are. There is little sense of how serious crimes are actually organised and 
what this tells us about the possibilities for crime reduction. Whilst subsequent iterations of 
the annual OCTA have refined the discussion of its core concepts, the ramifications of its law 
enforcement-centred strategy remain. The assessment for 2011, for example, identifies the 
gƌoǁiŶg iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of the iŶteƌŶet as a ͚keǇ faĐilitatoƌ͛ of oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe, it Ŷotes the 
iŶĐƌeased diǀeƌsifiĐatioŶ of OCGs iŶto ͚ŵulti-ĐoŵŵoditǇ͛ aŶd ͚polǇ-ĐƌiŵiŶal͛ aĐtiǀities, Ŷotes 
the iŶĐƌeased ĐollaďoƌatioŶ aŵoŶgst OCGs iŶ ͚ƌegioŶal huďs͛ aĐƌoss Euƌope aŶd the 
corruption of experts in transport, finance, real estate, law and pharmaceuticals who can 
facilitate serious crimes (OCTA, 2011: 5-6), ǁhilst still ĐoŶĐludiŶg that, ͚Taƌgeted laǁ 
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enforcement action is needed to tackle the most dangerous criminal groups operating in 
Euƌope͛ ;iďid. ϰͿ.  
 
SOCTA 2013 – 2017 
The establishment of the EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment for the 2013 – 
2017 period was promoted by the Director of Europol, Rob Wainwright, as a significant 
development in thinking that takes policy-making about organised crime beyond the OCTA. 
He describes it as a strategic report that, ͚delivers a set of recommendations based on an in-
depth analysis of the major crime threats facing the EU. The Council of Justice and Home 
Affairs Ministers will use these recommendations to define priorities for the coming four 
years.͛ ;“OCTA ϮϬϭϯ: ϱͿ. IŶ additioŶ to this ŵoƌe ŵediuŵ-term focus, following a decision in 
ϮϬϭϬ to shift to a ͚ŵulti-aŶŶual poliĐǇ ĐǇĐle͛ foƌ ƌespoŶdiŶg to pƌoďleŵs of oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe, 
the “OCTA is pƌeŵised oŶ, ͚a Ŷeǁ ŵethodologǇ͛ that ǁas deǀeloped oǀeƌ the Đouƌse of 
2011-ϮϬϭϮ, ͚by Europol in cooperation with the SOCTA expert group composed of 
ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀes fƌoŵ EU Meŵďeƌ “tates, Euƌopol͛s thiƌd paƌtŶeƌ ĐouŶtƌies aŶd 
organisations, the European Commission and Council General Secretariat.͛ ;“OCTA, ϮϬϭϯ: 
42). The SOCTA methodology is represented as developing threat assessment beyond the 
previous OCTA by refining indications of OCGs and augmenting these with indices of Serious 
Organised Crime areas (SOCs), their Effects on EU society and the identification of various 
Crime-Related Factors (CRFs) in the environment which can either facilitate or inhibit OCGs 
and SOCs. These distinguishing characteristics of the new methodology are summarised in 
Table 3. 
 
In a novel development, the SOCTA methodology is also accompanied by a response from 
three academic researchers interested in organised crime, Dr Xavier Raufer, Professor Dr 
Arndt Sinn and Professor Max Taylor (SOCTA 2013, 44-45). They congratulate Europol and 
the “OCTA teaŵ oŶ, ͚the pƌoduĐtioŶ of a thoƌough aŶd ĐoŵpeteŶt aŶalǇsis͛, ǁhiĐh helps to 
develop the kind of appƌoaĐh that is Ŷeeded to uŶdeƌstaŶd ͚the tƌaŶs-border character of 
ŵuĐh seƌious Đƌiŵe͛ ;“OCTA, ϮϬϭϯ: ϰϰͿ. TheǇ ideŶtifǇ a Ŷuŵďeƌ of likelǇ futuƌe tƌeŶds and 
issues: ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg the ďalaŶĐe of fƌeedoŵ aŶd seĐuƌitǇ thƌough ͚good laǁ eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt 
informed by sophistiĐated aŶalǇsis to iŶfoƌŵ poliĐǇ deĐisioŶs͛; the ĐhaŶgiŶg ďalaŶĐe 
between politically-driven and economically-driven terrorism; the hybridisation of criminal 
activity (similar to earlier arguments about multi-commodity poly-criminal organisations), 
for example the use of the internet by OCGs to diversify into multiple illicit markets from 
fƌaud to ĐouŶteƌfeit goods as iŶ the eǆaŵple of , ͚The “ilk ‘oad͛; the unintended and 
currently unforeseen consequences of general technological developments for serious crime 
opportunities; and changes in the demand for different kinds of drugs amongst different age 
cohorts as previously lucrative markets decline to be replaced by markets for new 
intoxicants including new synthetic drugs.  
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Table 3. The SOCTA Methodology 
 
Aim and 
Scope 
 Analyse the character or threatening features of organised crime groups 
(OCGs);  Analyse the threatening features of serious and organised crime areas of 
activity (SOC areas);  Analyse threatening aspects of OCG and SOC areas by region;  Define the most threatening OCGs, criminal areas and their regional dimension. 
Development 
from OCSR 
 Present and future-oriented not retrospective threat assessment. 
Development 
from OCTA 
 
• The sĐope aŶd use of iŶdiĐatoƌs foƌ oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe groups (OCGs) has increased 
and indicators have been developed to analyse SOC areas. 
• HoƌizoŶ sĐaŶŶiŶg has ďeeŶ added to ďetteƌ defiŶe futuƌe thƌeats. 
• The effeĐts of “OC aŶd Đƌiŵe ƌeleǀaŶt faĐtoƌs aƌe aŶalǇsed iŶ detail to alloǁ foƌ 
better and more focused prioritisation. 
Data Sources The SOCTA is based on data from law enforcement agencies and open sources.  
Law enforcement data includes:  data available within Europol;  data obtained from MS via questionnaires, and  data obtained from third organisations and countries.  
 
The open sources material used has been carefully evaluated for the reliability of the 
source and the validity of the information. 
Threat 
indicators 
Tailored indicators describe and assess the intrinsic characteristics of OCGs and SOC 
areas and are used to assign their respective level of threat.  
 
OCG indicators  Low: cooperation with other groups, expertise, external violence, 
countermeasures against law enforcement;  Medium: adaptable and flexible, level of resources, the use of LBS, active in 
multiple crime areas;  High: an international dimension to their activities, the use of corruption. 
 
SOC indicators  Low: resource availability, social tolerance, linked crime areas;  Medium: innovation, number of groups active and evolution of the crime 
area;  High: international dimension and high profits. 
 
Effect indicators  Measure the effect that OCGs and crime areas have on EU society.  
 
These indicators are key in identifying priority threats and arriving at substantiated 
recommendations. 
 
Crime-Related Factors (CRF) are facilitating factors and vulnerabilities in the 
environment that have an influence on current and future opportunities or barriers 
for OCGs and SOC areas. CRF are analysed via horizon scanning, which aims to 
identify future trends in society and future crime threats. 
Source: European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2013 (SOCTA, 2013: 42-3). 
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These academics also identify key challenges in the methodological conundrum of 
prediction in future-oriented approaches to threat assessment. As predictive models are 
invariably premised on the extrapolation of historical data, they condemn analysts to fight 
the last battle rather than genuinely anticipate and effectively intervene against novel 
ĐƌiŵiŶal pƌaĐtiĐes. As a ƌespoŶse to this ĐoŶuŶdƌuŵ theǇ suggest, ďut doŶ͛t eǆplaiŶ, the 
Ŷeed foƌ ͚ĐoŶtiŶuous Đƌiŵe tƌeŶd sĐaŶŶiŶg, eǆteŶdiŶg the “OCTA appƌoaĐh to suppoƌt a 
ŵoƌe pƌoaĐtiǀe appƌoaĐh͛ ;“OCTA ϮϬϭϯ: ϰϱͿ. TheǇ also Ŷote a ĐoŶĐeptual Ŷeed to recognise 
the mobility of multi-commodity poly-criminal actors across national and administrative 
boundaries and the need to avoid the kind of mirror-imaging that has debilitated previous 
security strategies (see also Sheptycki, 2003). They argue that global crime problems require 
global policy responses, otherwise security agencies bound by national and other 
adŵiŶistƌatiǀe ďouŶdaƌies aƌe destiŶed to ďe outflaŶked ďǇ the iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ͚flat͛ Ŷetǁoƌked 
and distributed organisation of criminal activity. Finally, Raufer, Sinn and Taylor discuss the 
implication of these future trends for the process, as well as the content, of threat 
assessment, arguing that it will have to be more dynamic, flexible and responsive than 
previous exercises that were too slow and bureaucratised to keep pace with adaptations in 
criminal organisation. The last point echoes a long-established criticism of the policy 
response to organised crime ďǇ ƌeseaƌĐheƌs ŶotiŶg the ͚pƌotiefoƌŵ͛ Ƌualities of seƌious 
crime in which adaptations are fuelled ďǇ aŶ oŶgoiŶg ͚aƌŵs ƌaĐe͛ ďetǁeeŶ peƌpetƌatoƌs aŶd 
preventers to outwit and outflank each other (Dorn, 2003; Ekblom, 2003).  
 
Even so, Raufer et al., argue that, ͚the “OCTA pƌoĐess aŶd ŵethodologǇ ǁe ďelieǀe to ďe 
robust enough to track and inform the problems these [challenges] might imply for the 
future.͛ ;“OCTA ϮϬϭϯ: ϰϱ). In this regard, however, it is worth citing criticism of the first UK 
Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime by the newly established National 
Crime Agency (NCA, 2014), which adopts a similar conceptual approach to that of the EU 
SOCTA. AŶalǇsts fƌoŵ the ‘oǇal UŶited “eƌǀiĐes IŶstitute͛s oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe pƌogƌaŵŵe 
argue that: 
 
 
The way organised crime is addressed in the UK has undergone a major overhaul in 
the last few years with the creation of the National Crime Agency. The first strategic 
assessment provides a good snapshot of the current state of organised crime. 
However, it points to a lack of knowledge about organised crime and its drivers – 
some of which could be addressed through research and deeper analysis. If the NCA 
is going to have a better record than its predecessors, it must work on getting the 
basics right. Knowing your enemy would be a good start (RUSI, 2014) 
 
 
Similarly, it isŶ͛t Đleaƌ the indices of OCGs, SOCs, Effects and CRFs defined in the SOCTA 
methodology actually tell us much about the drivers of serious crime or, more prosaically, 
how serious crimes are actually organised. The failure to pose this basic question, let alone 
͚gettiŶg it ƌight͛, ƌeŵaiŶs the ŵost ƌeŵaƌkaďle ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐ of the politiĐs aŶd 
jurisprudence of group offending in this policy area. Indeed it can be argued that it is the 
jurisprudential preoccupation with criminal law enforcement rather than crime and harm 
reduction that explains much of this basic theory failure in the policy response to organised 
crime. In this regard, and notwithstanding the preoccupation with the flat, networked and 
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distributed organisation of criminal activity, the actor-oriented legacy of Kefauver and 
Cressey remains strong in SOCTA 2013. Whilst not wishing to doubt the importance of the 
criminal prosecution of serious offenders for heinous crimes, realising the difference 
between criminal law enforcement on the one hand and crime and harm reduction on the 
other remains important for innovations in the future development of the policy-research 
relationship.  
 
The Organisation of Serious Crimes: Commissioning processes 
The distinction between law enforcement and crime reduction does not preclude the role of 
the former in the latter, only the treatment of the two as synonymous. If crime reduction is 
more than law enforcement, what else is it? Concepts taken from volume crime reduction, 
of household burglary and automobile thefts for example, have been used by criminologists 
to rethink the organisation of serious crimes (Cornish and Clarke, 2002; Ekblom, 2003; Levi 
and Maguire, 2004; Felson, 2006; Levi, 2007, see also Greenfield and Paoli, 2010; Vander 
Beken and Verfaillie, 2010). From this literature it is possible to identify a number of core 
propositions: 
 
1. Reducing serious crimes entails an analytical focus on the commissioning of offences: 
a. The attributes of perpetrators (whether lone offenders or co-offenders in 
alleged ͚oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe gƌoups͛ aƌe ͚AlďaŶiaŶ͛, ͚ChiŶese͛, ͚‘ussiaŶ͛ oƌ 
whatever) are of concern only in so far as they help explain the 
commissioning process (for example the use of ethnicity and kinship as a 
resource for trafficking illicit goods and in ways that insulate trafficking 
networks from disruption, including interdiction by law enforcement) but of 
themselves have no intrinsic analytical value; 
 
b. The offence-focus implies a concern with specific types of crime and a 
presumption (to be corroborated and refined through comparative empirical 
research) that different types of crime necessitate different commissioning 
processes or, to use a criminological term, they necessitate different ͚criŵe 
scripts͛ which break-down any crime into the particular sequence of activities 
through which it is accomplished (trafficking heroin from the Middle East into 
Western Europe, for example, requires a different script from the sourcing of 
materials for, and the production and distribution of, counterfeit fashion 
apparel and so on and so forth). 
 
2. Understanding the commissioning of serious crimes entails an analytical concern 
with the interactions of offenders, victims and guardians in specific social contexts: 
a. CoŶtƌaƌǇ to the dƌaŵatiĐ foĐus oŶ the puƌsuit aŶd pƌoseĐutioŶ of ͚Đƌiŵe 
ďosses͛, ͚kiŶgpiŶs͛ aŶd ͚Đoƌe ŶoŵiŶals͛, a ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁith the ĐoŵŵissioŶiŶg 
process also reveals the routine interactions between offenders, their targets 
and the presence or absence of capable guardians that consequently create 
opportunities for serious crime (for example the interaction of illegal drug 
dealers and consumers on street corners, public parks and other notorious 
places that are under-poliĐed oƌ otheƌǁise ͚uŶŵaŶaged͛Ϳ; 
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b. A concern with the interactions through which specific crimes are 
ĐoŵŵissioŶed ŶeedŶ͛t liŵit the aŶalǇtiĐal foĐus to paƌtiĐulaƌ situatioŶal 
settings (such as street corners or public parks) nor to current or 
retrospective knowledge about serious crime. It can broaden the social 
contexts of commissioning to include other kinds of environments, such as 
transnational markets and e-commerce through the internet, and to 
anticipate future ͚sceŶarios͛, including the likely consequences of different 
policy responses for escalating or reducing crime rates (Vander Beken and 
Verfaillie, 2010). Renowned examples include the impact of law enforcement 
operations against drug dealers generating violent turf wars for the share of 
markets freed-up by the successful removal of particular dealers or the likely 
consequences of decriminalising illicit drug use for public health and safety.   
 
3. The harmful effects, the ͚seƌiousŶess͛, of seƌious Đƌiŵe eŶtails Ŷoƌŵatiǀe as ǁell as 
empirical analysis and interpretation as well as measurement in the prioritisation of 
the policy response: 
a. Another implication of the distinction between law enforcement and crime 
reduction is to shift the focus of policy outcomes from successes or failures in 
the prosecution of offenders for predicate offences, the volume of their 
criminal assets that are confiscated or the volume of illicit goods that are 
captured, towards reductions in the harmful consequences of these offences. 
The presumption here is that incapacitation or disruption of particular 
offenders does little to alter or debilitate the commissioning process or its 
harmful impact, particularly in highly lucrative markets such as the trade in 
narcotics, where there are many recruits waiting to step into the shoes of 
incarcerated or otherwise incapacitated offenders; 
 
b. Establishing the relative harm of different types of serious crime is a 
challenging exercise, beyond the kind of legal criteria favoured by the former 
Serious Organised Crime Agency in the UK, which defined seriousness in 
terms of an offence which would incur a prison sentence of at least 3 years 
on first conviction (SOCA, 2006:5n1). It entails challenges that are both 
Ŷoƌŵatiǀe ;͚ǁhat ĐoŶstitutes a haƌŵ aŶd fƌoŵ ǁhose peƌspeĐtiǀe?͛Ϳ aŶd 
empirical (whether to calculate harms in terms of gross figures or net of 
possible benefits, for example the therapeutic benefits that are believed to 
accrue from cannabis use for those suffering neurological complaints; 
whether to tally harms over a year, a decade or a lifetime; and the 
comŵeŶsuƌaďilitǇ of diffeƌeŶt haƌŵful effeĐts, saǇ ͚ďatteƌed ĐhildƌeŶ aŶd 
household ďuƌglaƌies͛ as haƌŵful effeĐts of illiĐit dƌugs use, see GƌeeŶfield 
and Paoli, 2010: 8-9). Even so, attempts are currently being made to develop 
a ͚risk assessŵeŶt ŵatrix͛ that ƌaŶks haƌŵs aĐĐoƌdiŶg to theiƌ ͚seǀeƌitǇ͛ ;oŶ a 
sĐale fƌoŵ Ŷegligiďle to ĐatastƌophiĐͿ aŶd theiƌ ͚pƌoďaďilitǇ͛ ;fƌoŵ uŶlikelǇ to 
frequent). Although not without some interpretative flexibility, this matrix at 
least provides the analyst with a systematic starting point for prioritising the 
seriousness of certain activities relative to others from one extreme (frequent 
and catastrophic) to another (unlikely and negligible) (Greenfield and Paoli, 
2010: 16). 
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4. Analysis of the scripts, scenarios and harmful effects of organising serious crimes 
implies a more concrete identification of weak points oƌ ͚ǀulŶeƌaďilities͛ in the 
commissioning process for specific types of crime and their prioritisation in policy 
responses: 
a. Emerging work in this field identifies border controls, shipping routes and 
visa applications as notable weak points in trafficking human beings and 
transporting stolen vehicles (Levi and Maguire, 2004: 428-9). Other examples 
of weak points identified through script analysis include the ease with which 
paǇŵeŶt Đaƌd fƌaud Đould ďe ĐoŵŵissioŶed ;pƌioƌ to the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of ͚Đhip 
aŶd piŶ͛ ĐaƌdsͿ ;Iďid. ϰϯϯ-8), or the ease with which amphetamine-type 
stimulants can be manufactured using legal precursor chemicals procured 
from pharmacies (Chiu et al, 2011) or the ease with which Vehicle 
Identification Numbers (VINs) could be switched from legal but wrecked 
automobiles to stolen vehicles for the purposes of resale (Tremblay et al, 
2001: 568); 
 
b. These sĐƌipts ƌeǀeal the iŵpoƌtaŶt ƌole of Đƌiŵe ͚pƌoŵoteƌs͛, whether 
intentional and corrupted or unwitting, in supporting offenders in the 
commissioning of serious crimes. Viewed from the perspective of 
commissioning, the key actors are not only the offenders but the pharmacies 
providing precursor chemicals, the payment card companies providing credit 
that can be easily forged and the vehicle licensing authorities operating 
licensing regimes open to abuse. 
 
c. Allied to the harm reduction framework, the analysis of commissioning 
informs a policy response that can prioritise the investment of resources in 
targeting weak points and in accordance with judgements about the severity 
aŶd pƌoďaďilitǇ of aŶǇ giǀeŶ Đƌiŵe tǇpe. This is espeĐiallǇ apposite iŶ aŶ ͚age 
of austeƌe͛ puďliĐ eǆpeŶdituƌe aŶd liŵited ƌesouƌĐes foƌ Đƌiŵe prevention, 
particularly inefficient and uneconomical exercises in law enforcement.    
 
5. A crime reduction strategy premised on the targeting of weak points in the 
commissioning process implies a broadening of the policy response from law 
enforcement to include other public authorities, the involvement of private 
organisations and public-private partnerships: 
a. The identification of crime promoters, as well as intentional co-offenders 
(conspirators, entrepreneurs and poly-criminals), in the commissioning 
process broadens the scope of crime reduction beyond law enforcement 
measures targeting known offenders. Allied to normative and empirical 
judgements about the harms associated with different crimes, this approach 
begins to suggest a rationale for a division of labour amongst public and 
pƌiǀate seĐtoƌ ͚pƌeǀeŶteƌs͛ aŶd oppoƌtuŶities foƌ puďliĐ-private partnerships 
in which the effort and costs of sustainable crime reduction are shared (Levi 
and Maguire, 2004: 417-23). In addition to charging public authorities other 
than the police (such as vehicle licensing) and private organisations (such as 
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solicitors and accountants) with surveillance and enforcement duties in 
relation to the commission of serious crimes, this policy trend generates a 
wider repertoire of policy choices. It might, for example, be argued that 
scarce public resources are better concentrated on crimes that are more 
frequent and more critical (if not catastrophic) for a higher proportion of the 
public (Greenfield and Paoli, 2010). The exemplar of this harm-based 
calculation being the trade in class A narcotics but, it could be argued 
according to this kind of calculus, also the on-line trade in counterfeit 
prescription drugs, the sale of contraband alcohol and cigarettes (Hornsby 
and Hobbs, 2007) aŶd the eŵeƌgiŶg tƌade iŶ ͚ĐouŶteƌfeit ŵeat͛, all of which 
generate high volume threats to public health. In turn, it might be argued 
that counterfeiting of luxury fashion goods (whilst now a sizeable illicit 
market) is less of a priority for public policy, as it is relatively less severe in its 
consequences than other crimes demanding a public response and that 
responsibility for its reduction ought to lie firmly with private organisations, 
their insurance companies and private security providers (Wall and Large, 
2010); 
 
b. Whilst highly controversial, not least because of its explicit prioritisation of 
policy responses and targets, the harm reduction approach provides a 
normative as well as empirical framework for the politics and jurisprudence 
of group offending. It enables deliberation about the necessary prioritisation 
of alternative policy agendas for criminal, restorative and social justice and 
for risk management and their relationship to sustainable public protection in 
contexts of austere public expenditure (Edwards and Hughes, 2012; Edwards, 
Hughes and Lord, 2013). 
 
 
6. This broadening of the policy response also implies a concern with the conditions or 
͚sĐeŶes͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh sĐƌipts aƌe plaǇed out resulting in more or less harmful scenarios. 
The concept of scenes alerts us to the importance of an analytical concern with the 
conditions that can enable or frustrate scripts and their re-writing: 
a. Following the dramaturgical metaphor, it can be acknowledged that scenes 
provide possibilities for improvisation in the script and are not crudely 
deterministic of performance. Even so they suggest a certain narrative 
progression in the script which actors are disciplined to follow and do not 
completely re-write each time they perform; 
 
b. Disambiguating improvisation and narrative in serious crime scenes is in part 
a question for ͚ĐoŶĐƌete͛, empirical research, requiring access to the accounts 
that can be elicited through qualitative interviews with offenders, victims, 
ĐoŶtƌol ageŶts aŶd otheƌ ƌeseaƌĐheƌs ;͚peƌp talk͛, ͚suƌǀiǀoƌ talk͛, ͚DoŶ talk͛ as 
ǁell as ͚ĐoŶtƌol talk͛Ϳ aŶd theiƌ ĐoŶstƌuĐt ǀalidatioŶ, iŶĐludiŶg the sĐƌipts, 
scenarios and scenes that emerge from cross-examination in court 
proceedings (Levi, 2008). As a precursor to this it is, however, also possible to 
engage in abstract research entailing thought experiments about the 
necessary and contingent social relations that render serious crimes possible 
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(Edwards and Levi, 2008). An instance of this kind of thinking has been 
provided by Felson (2006), in which improvisation around narratives is 
understood in terms of the routine activities enabling the necessary supply of 
offenders, presence of targets and absence of capable guardians (or presence 
of more than capable but corrupted guardians); 
 
c. Perhaps this kind of abstract research is what Raufer et al  meant through 
theiƌ ƌefeƌeŶĐe to aŶtiĐipatiŶg seƌious Đƌiŵe futuƌes thƌough ͚ĐoŶtiŶuous 
criŵe tƌeŶd sĐaŶŶiŶg͛ although it souŶds ŵoƌe like soŵe iŶduĐtiǀe eǆeƌĐise iŶ 
big data mining rather than the kind of theory-driven research advocated 
here (see also Housley, Procter and Edwards et al, 2014); 
 
d. It is through the more systematic thinking through of these relations in 
assembling explanations of crime scripts, scenarios and scenes that social 
research can influence, not just critique, the turn towards anticipatory forms 
of governing serious crimes.  
 
IŶ this ƌegaƌd theƌe is a Ŷeed to ĐhalleŶge the laŶguage aŶd assuŵptioŶs of Đƌiŵe ͚aŶalǇsts͛ 
allied to the policy process and to rehabilitate an older language of social research that 
renders explicit the different practices necessary at various stages of social scientific work 
(Keat and Urry, 1981: 248-9, see below). ‘eseaƌĐhiŶg, ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚aŶalǇsiŶg͛, the 
organisation of serious crimes alters the relationship between social scientists and the policy 
community. This shifts the policy-research relationship away from a view that social 
scientists ought to be enrolled into agendas set by policy-makers to service their technical 
refinement or better communication to broader publics. Conversely, the language of 
research locates social scientists as constructive critics of these agendas inhabiting a culture 
of organised scepticism that can pose alternative visions of control. These alternatives may, 
for example, entail counter-intuitive (for law enforcement agencies) forms of non-
enforcement such as triggering self-regulation (Edwards and Gill, 2002).  
 
 
Researching the Organisation of Serious Crimes 
 
Whilst the policy trend towards a focus on the organisation of serious crime remains 
subordinate to the other policy trends considered above, it is gaining increasing salience 
amongst the research community. Policy-oriented learning can be understood in relation to 
the types of research strategy implied by this trend and these can be distinguished in terms 
of generalizations aďout ͚oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe͛ as a siŶgulaƌ suďjeĐt, abstraction (or thought 
experiments) about the processes or mechanisms through which serious crimes can be 
commissioned and concrete research into empirical cases of how these mechanisms 
combine in the organisation of particular types of crime in certain social contexts (Keat and 
Urry, 1981: 248-9). Finally, research could consider the prospects for a synthesis of these 
research strategies to question whether there are any generic lessons to be drawn from 
comparative case studies of how particular crimes are organised and any complementarities 
or inter-dependencies in the commissioning of different crimes (cf. Sayer, 1992: 236-41). 
Such a synthesis is, for example, the logical implication of critically testing assertions about 
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the emergence of multi-commodity poly-criminals. The key components of these research 
strategies and their relationship to one another are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Types of Research Strategy 
S1 S2 S3 Sn
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 Mn
E1 E2 E3 E4 En
Source: Adapted from Sayer, 1992: 237
KEY
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E = Effects
M = Mechanisms
S = Structures
 
 
These distinctions, taken from methodological debates in the social sciences (Sayer, 1992: 
237) are helpful in clarifying how research strategies steer policy-oriented learning towards 
certain questions and away from others. As a research strategy, generalisation regards the 
effects of social relations or social events in relatively simple terms, its main purpose being 
to identify regularities and common properties. It is possible to understand conspiracy 
theories, illicit enterprise models and threat assessments as exercises in generalisation 
insofar as they define organised crime in terms of the attributes of organised crime groups 
;͚utilisiŶg ĐoŵŵeƌĐial oƌ ďusiŶess-like stƌuĐtuƌes͛, ͚eŵploǇiŶg ǀioleŶĐe aŶd otheƌ foƌŵs of 
iŶtiŵidatioŶ͛, ͚eǆeƌtiŶg iŶflueŶĐe oŶ puďliĐ authoƌities thƌough ĐoƌƌuptioŶ͛, ͚ethŶiĐallǇ 
hoŵogeŶous͛, ͚teƌƌitoƌiallǇ-ďased͛ ͚haǀiŶg a laƌge iŶteƌŶatioŶal pƌeseŶĐe͛ etĐ., etĐ.Ϳ. As 
suggested iŶ the ͚oƌgaŶisatioŶ of seƌious Đƌiŵes͛ paƌadigŵ, hoǁeǀeƌ, this is a theoƌetiĐal 
failure that reduces oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe to a siŶgulaƌ, siŵple, thiŶg iŶ oƌdeƌ to ask hoǁ ͚it͛ is 
organised, rather than focussing on specific criminal activities and how they are organised 
through various scripts, in certain scenes with variegated scenarios. In this framework, the 
keǇ ƋuestioŶs foƌ ƌeseaƌĐh, ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚aŶalǇsis͛, ďeĐoŵe: Hoǁ the iŶteƌaĐtioŶ of sĐƌipts, 
scenes and scenarios can evolve over time, what they tell us about the actual 
commissioning of crimes and what this suggests for the identification of vulnerabilities that 
can, in turn, be targeted for the purposes of harm reduction?  
 
To understand the organisation of serious crimes it is necessary to replace generalisations 
aďout oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe gƌoups ǁith a foĐus oŶ ͚ĐoŶĐƌete͛ Đƌiŵe tǇpes and their possible 
interrelationship or hybridisation. IŶ these teƌŵs ͚ŵulti-commodity poly-ĐƌiŵiŶalitǇ͛ aƌe 
indications of how scripts, scenes and scenarios are evolving but there is still a need to build 
explanations of how such scripts are accomplished. As such ͚ĐoŶĐƌete͛ refers to the idea of 
regarding commissioning processes as ͚uŶities of diǀeƌse deteƌŵiŶatioŶs͛ ;“aǇeƌ, ϭϵϵϮ: ϮϯϲͿ. 
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Analysis of crime scripts and scenarios seek to capture the multifarious mechanisms 
;sigŶified iŶ Figuƌe ϭ., ďǇ Mϭ, MϮ, Mϯ … MŶͿ that ĐoŵďiŶe to generate different 
commissioning eǀeŶts ;Eϭ, EϮ, Eϯ … EŶͿ aŶd that ĐaŶ ĐoŵďiŶe iŶ diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇs to pƌoduĐe 
different crime outcomes (M1 + M2 = E1; M3 + M4 = E2; M4 + M5 = E3; M6 = E4 etc.). To 
take the example of the manufacture and distribution of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants 
(ATS) discussed by Chiu et al (2011), it is possible to identify several mechanisms: 
 
M1: Location of laboratory (House, shed); 
M2: Getting the goods (legal purchase, illegal purchase, social network); 
M3: Storage of goods (Laboratory, rental sheds, storage facilities); 
M4: Cooking drug (Test cooks, chemist experts); 
M5: Packaging drug; 
M6: Distribution of drug (In person, official courier); 
M7: Benefits (Personal consumption, money).  
(Adapted from Chiu et al, 2011: 362). 
 
 
These mechanisms can be regarded as the necessary requirements of synthetic drug 
production and distribution yet whether and how they actually come together to 
successfully commission this criminal enterprise is contingent on various context-specific 
factors: the capacity to source and store precursor chemicals (in sufficient quantities at 
regular intervals), to recruit the necessary expertise to combine these chemicals, to store 
and distribute the final product in ways that do not attract the attention of the authorities 
and so forth. In turn this crime script suggests potential vulnerabilities in the commissioning 
process that might prove more amenable to remediation than laborious and expensive law 
enforcement strategies targeting perpetrators for the purposes of criminal prosecution and 
sanctioning. For example, a stricter licensing regime for the legal sale of chemical precursors 
and monitoring of pharmacies monthly stocks and sales. 
 
Implicit in the analysis of crime scripts and more explicit in the concept of crime scenes and 
scenarios (which are often less observable), is the importance of thought experiments or 
͚aďstƌaĐtioŶ͛, to ideŶtifǇ possiďle Đausal ŵeĐhaŶisŵs. AďstƌaĐtioŶ fulfils tǁo keǇ aŶalǇtiĐal 
purposes. It counters self-referential thinking, for example, the recycling of current political 
and law enforcement categories and frames of reference, by encouraging researchers to 
employ other frames of reference such as framing the drug trade as an issue of public 
health, addiction and compulsive consumptioŶ Ŷot just ͚ƌatioŶal ĐhoiĐe͛ oƌ as aŶ issue of 
thrill-seeking cultural practices aŶd otheƌ ͚Ŷotes oŶ the sĐƌipt͛ ;see HaǇǁaƌd aŶd YouŶg, 
2004 and Wall and Large, 2010, on counterfeiting of luxury fashion goods as a cultural 
practice). Secondly, it encourages researchers to think about the social structures that 
generate these mechanisms and their possible ways of acting (signified in Figure 1., by S1, 
S2, “ϯ …“ŶͿ. It eŶĐouƌages ƌeseaƌĐheƌs to connect social structural trends to crime 
commissioning processes in, for example, the consequences of substantial sovereign debts 
for public expenditure on law enforcement and other preventive efforts; the expansion of 
the drugs trade as an alternative to reduced employment opportunities in legal economies; 
the increased demand for contraband and counterfeit goods given reductions in disposable 
income and prices in the formal economy (including increasing costs in commodities such as 
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the global meat markets); the impact of civil wars and military interventions on governing 
capacity and as drivers of serious crime to fund (para)military campaigns etc.  
 
Some advocates of crime script analysis eschew this kind of structural analysis as an 
unnecessary distraction from identifying the situational opportunities for commissioning 
serious crimes and the more pragmatic, feasible, strategies for prevention implied by a 
foĐus oŶ ͚pƌoǆiŵate͛ faĐtoƌs, ƌatheƌ thaŶ the ͚distal͛ faĐtoƌs that aƌe the ĐoŶĐeƌŶ of politiĐal-
economy (Cornish and Clarke, 2002). However, structural analysis remains important for 
establishing the governing capacity for responding to emerging crimes; what, for example, 
ĐaŶ ͚Đapaďle guaƌdiaŶship͛ ŵeaŶ iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of ŵajoƌ ƌeduĐtioŶs iŶ poliĐe, ŵuŶiĐipal 
government and other statutory services within countries experiencing severe crises of 
sovereign debt? What else can capable guardianship mean in the context of weak states 
where criminal enterprises provide what limited employment opportunities and welfare 
services are available to marginalised populations? How sustainable are crime reductions in 
a context where, to return to the insights of the Wickersham Commission, capable 
guardianship has been captured, if not owned, by criminal enterprises? (Edwards and Levi, 
2008: 378-81).  
 
The, as yet, untried synthesis of these research strategies suggests a future direction for the 
policy-research relationship in responding to serious crimes. It addresses a conceptual 
problem with the offence-specific focus of crime script analyses, which is that 
interconnections and interdependencies may exist across different crimes, amounting to a 
Đuŵulatiǀe pƌoďleŵ, the ͚ŵulti-ĐoŵŵoditǇ͛ aŶd ͚polǇ-ĐƌiŵiŶal͛ eŶteƌpƌises ideŶtified iŶ the 
EU OCTA ;OCTA, ϮϬϭϭͿ. These iŶteƌĐoŶŶeĐtioŶs aƌe ͚fƌaŵed-out͛ of aŶ aŶalǇtiĐal foĐus oŶ 
the commissioning of specific crimes, notwithstanding the depth of insight that concrete 
studies of commissioning can yield. For example, some crimes, such as armed robbery or, in 
the digital age, the less risky enterprise of internet fraud, may be committed as an end in 
themselves or to fund entry into more lucrative drug markets, which may in turn fund the 
trafficking of people into the sex industry or other labour markets.  
 
Whether and how these specific crime types are interconnected is a moot point for a 
research strategy that looks for the mechanisms connecting the commission of different 
crime types (signified in Figure 1., by the relationship of M4 to both E2 and E3). A significant 
pay-off from this synthesis could be the identification of particular mechanisms (for 
example, absent border controls (M4)) that if targeted could yield sustainable reductions in 
several serious crimes (for example traffic in human beings + narcotics (E2 + E3)). Synthesis 
also encompasses generalisations, for example regularities in commissioning processes, 
ǁhiĐh ŵight pƌoǀe iŵpoƌtaŶt foƌ ideŶtifǇiŶg those Đausal ŵeĐhaŶisŵs ǁhiĐh aƌe ͚supeƌ-
ǁeak poiŶts͛ ;suĐh as ďoƌdeƌ aŶd poƌt ĐoŶtƌolsͿ iŶ the ĐoŵŵissioŶiŶg of seǀeƌal seƌious 
crime types and which could be employed in strategies aiŵed at ͚polǇ-Đƌiŵe͛ eŶteƌpƌises.  
 
Synthesis also provides a research strategy for testing propositions about crime deflection 
or displacement (Pease, 1994) and how these can impact on the reduction of serious crimes. 
For example, the malign displacement of stable drugs markets into violent turf wars is a 
renowned criticism of law enforcement interventions within the field of drugs policy 
(Edwards and Gill, 2002), less clear is the displacement effects of intervention against 
certain serious crimes (e.g. narcotics trafficking) for driving the diversification of criminal 
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enterprises into commissioning other crime types (e.g. fraudulent e-commerce; 
counterfeiting etc.). In these terms, synthesis supports the normative and empirical 
questions provoked by the harm reduction approach; whether, for example, a strategic 
policy ought to be adopted for deliberately seeking to deflect the organisation of serious 
crimes that could be regarded as more severe and more probable onto those with a lower 
threshold of severity. The broader point is that as a research strategy, synthesis better 
facilitates the kind of strategic and anticipatory policy-ŵakiŶg that is ƌeƋuiƌed iŶ ͚austeƌe͛ 
economic conditions where motivations for organising serious crimes are fuelled whilst 
governing capacity is weakened. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
If the aspiƌatioŶ foƌ ͚eǀideŶĐe-ďased͛ poliĐǇ-making is retained, these methodological 
considerations become even more significant for public debate. If the aspiration is to escape 
the self-referential narratives of law enforcement and re-frame policy responses to serious 
crimes in ways that are more suited to the scenarios presented by the political-economic 
challenges of the present, current trends in criminological research present grounds for 
guarded optimism. Although methodological innovations in the analysis of crime scripts, 
scenes, scenarios and their harms are still nascent, they are already beginning to 
demonstrate the advantages of broadening policy-oriented learning beyond a 
preoccupation with actor-oriented accounts to the processes through which serious crimes 
are actually commissioned and the social structures which generate these processes and 
imply targets for strategic interventions. The normative dimension of researching 
commissioning processes and their consequences also provides a basis for deliberation 
about dilemmas in the politics and jurisprudence of group offending, specifically the 
evidential grounds for pre-emptive interventions in the pursuit of restorative and social 
justice driven policy responses relative to admixtures of criminal justice and risk 
management. 
 
 
 
  
22 
 
References 
Campana, P. (2015) ͚The Structure of Human Trafficking: Lifting The Bonnet On A Nigerian 
TƌaŶsŶatioŶal Netǁoƌk͛, British Journal of Criminology, published on-line 10.06.2015: 
doi:10.1093/bjc/azv027 
Chiu, Y-N., LeĐleƌĐ, B. aŶd ToǁŶsleǇ, M. ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ͚Cƌiŵe “Đƌipt AŶalǇsis of Dƌug MaŶufaĐtuƌiŶg 
iŶ ClaŶdestiŶe Laďoƌatoƌies͛, British Journal of Criminology, 51: 355-374. 
Cornish, D.B. and Clarke, R. ;ϮϬϬϮͿ ͚AŶalǇziŶg OƌgaŶized Cƌiŵes͛, iŶ A. PiƋueƌo aŶd “. 
Tibbetts (Eds) Rational Choice and Criminal Behaviour, London, Routledge. 
Cressey, D. (1969) Theft of a Nation, New York, Harper and Row. 
DoƌŶ, N. ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ͚Pƌotiefoƌŵ ĐƌiŵiŶalities͛ iŶ A. Edǁaƌds aŶd P. Gill ;Eds.Ϳ TƌaŶsŶatioŶal 
OƌgaŶised Cƌiŵe: PeƌspeĐtiǀes oŶ gloďal seĐuƌity, LoŶdoŶ, ‘outledge. 
DoƌŶ, N. ;ϮϬϬϴͿ ͚The eŶd of oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe iŶ the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ͛, Crime, Law and Social 
Change, 51: 283-295. 
Edǁaƌds, A. ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ͚The OƌgaŶisatioŶ of “eƌious Cƌiŵes: KeǇ TƌeŶds iŶ PoliĐǇ aŶd ‘eseaƌĐh͛, 
in Julia Rafailovich, Snezhina Gabova and Stefan Popov (Eds.) Organized Crime, Civil 
Society and the Policy Process: Conference Proceedings, Sofia, RiskMonitor Foundation. 
Edǁaƌds, A. aŶd Gill, P. ;ϮϬϬϮͿ ͚Cƌiŵe as eŶteƌpƌise? The Đase of tƌaŶsŶatioŶal oƌgaŶised 
Đƌiŵe͛, Crime, Law and Social Change, 37/3: 203-33. 
Edwards, A. and Gill, P. (Eds.) (2003) Transnational Organised Crime: perspectives on global 
security, London, Routledge. 
Edǁaƌds, A. aŶd Hughes, G. ;ϮϬϭϮͿ ͚PuďliĐ “afetǇ ‘egiŵes: Negotiated oƌdeƌs aŶd politiĐal 
aŶalǇsis iŶ ĐƌiŵiŶologǇ͛, Criminology and Criminal Justice, 12/4: 433-58, 2012. 
Edǁaƌds, A., Hughes, G. aŶd Loƌd, N. ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ͚UƌďaŶ seĐuƌitǇ iŶ Euƌope: tƌaŶslating a concept 
iŶ puďliĐ ĐƌiŵiŶologǇ͛, European Journal of Criminology, 2013, 10/3: 260-83. 
Edǁaƌds, A. aŶd Leǀi, M. ;ϮϬϬϴͿ ͚‘eseaƌĐhiŶg the OƌgaŶisatioŶ of “eƌious Cƌiŵes͛, 
Criminology and Criminal Justice, 8/4: 363-388. 
Ekďloŵ, P. ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ͚OƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe aŶd the ĐoŶjuŶĐtioŶ of ĐƌiŵiŶal oppoƌtuŶitǇ fƌaŵeǁoƌk͛, 
in A. Edwards and P. Gill (Eds.) Transnational Organized Crime: Perspectives on Global 
Security, London, Routledge. 
Felson, M. (2006) The Ecosystem for Organized Crime, HEUNI Paper 26, Helsinki, The 
European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control. 
Fijnaut, C., Bovenkerk, F., Bruinsma, G. and Van de Bunt, H. (1998) Organised Crime in the 
Netherlands, The Hague, Kluwer Law International. 
Greenfield, V. and Paoli, L. (2010) If Supply-Oriented Drug Policy is Broken, Can Harm 
Reduction Help Fix It? — Melding Disciplines and Methods to Advance International Drug 
Control Policy, United States Naval Academy, Department of Economics Working Paper 
2010-30. 
GƌegoƌǇ, F. ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ͚ClassifǇ, ƌepoƌt aŶd ŵeasuƌe: the UK Organised Crime Notification 
“Đheŵe͛, iŶ A. Edǁaƌds aŶd P. Gill ;Eds.Ϳ Transnational Organized Crime: Perspectives on 
Global Security, London, Routledge. 
HaǇǁaƌd, K. aŶd YouŶg, J. ;ϮϬϬϰͿ ͚Cultuƌal CƌiŵiŶologǇ: soŵe Ŷotes oŶ the sĐƌipt͛, 
Theoretical Criminology, 8/3: 259-273. 
Hoďďs, D. ;ϮϬϬϭͿ ͚The Fiƌŵ: OƌgaŶizatioŶal LogiĐ aŶd CƌiŵiŶal Cultuƌe oŶ a “hiftiŶg TeƌƌaiŶ͛, 
British Journal of Criminology, 41: 549-560. 
HoƌŶsďǇ, ‘. aŶd Hoďďs, D. ;ϮϬϬϳͿ ͚A )oŶe of AŵďiguitǇ: The PolitiĐal EĐoŶoŵǇ of Cigaƌette 
BootleggiŶg͛, British Journal of Criminology, 47/4: 551-71. 
23 
 
Housley, W, R Procter, Edwards, A., P. Burnap, M. Williams, L. Sloan, O. Rana, J. Morgan, A. 
Voss aŶd A. GƌeeŶhill ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ͚Big aŶd ďƌoad soĐial data aŶd the soĐiologiĐal iŵagiŶatioŶ: 
a Đollaďoƌatiǀe ƌespoŶse͛, Big Data & Society April–June 2014: 1–15. 
iOCTA (2014) European Union Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment, The Hague, 
Europol. 
Keat, R. and Urry, J. (1981) Social Theory as Science, London, Routledge Kegan Paul. 
Kleƌks, P. ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ͚The Ŷetǁoƌk paƌadigŵ applied to ĐƌiŵiŶal oƌgaŶisatioŶs: theoretical 
nitpicking or a relevant doctrine for investigators? Recent developments in the 
NetheƌlaŶds͛, iŶ A. Edǁaƌds aŶd P. Gill ;Eds.Ϳ Transnational Organized Crime: Perspectives 
on Global Security, London, Routledge. 
Leǀi, M. ;ϮϬϬϳͿ ͚OƌgaŶised Cƌiŵe aŶd Teƌƌoƌisŵ͛, iŶ M. Maguiƌe, ‘. MoƌgaŶ aŶd ‘. ‘eiŶeƌ 
(Eds) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 4th Ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Leǀi, M. ;ϮϬϬϴͿ ͚OƌgaŶized fƌaud aŶd oƌgaŶiziŶg fƌauds: UŶpaĐkiŶg ƌeseaƌĐh oŶ Ŷetǁoƌks aŶd 
oƌgaŶizatioŶ͛, Criminology and Criminal Justice, 8/4: 389-419. 
Leǀi, M. aŶd Maguiƌe, M. ;ϮϬϬϰͿ ͚‘eduĐiŶg aŶd pƌeǀeŶtiŶg oƌgaŶized Đƌiŵe: aŶ eǀideŶĐe-
ďased ĐƌitiƋue͛, Crime, Law and Social Change, 41: 397-469. 
NaǇloƌ, T. ;ϭϵϵϳͿ ͚Mafia, MǇths aŶd Maƌkets: OŶ the TheoƌǇ aŶd PƌaĐtiĐe of EŶteƌpƌise 
Cƌiŵe͛, Transnational Organized Crime, 3/3: 1-45. 
National Crime Agency (NCA) (2014) National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised 
Crime 2014, London, NCA. 
OatleǇ, G. aŶd CƌiĐk, T. ;ϮϬϭϱͿ ͚MeasuƌiŶg UK Cƌiŵe GaŶgs: a soĐial Ŷetǁoƌk pƌoďleŵ͛, Social 
Network Analysis and Mining, 5:33, DOI 10.1007/s13278-015-0265-1  
OCTA (2006) European Union Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2006, The Hague, 
Europol. 
OCTA (2011) European Union Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2011, The Hague, 
Europol. 
Paoli, L. aŶd FijŶaut, C. ;ϮϬϬϰͿ ͚IŶtƌoduĐtioŶ to Paƌt I: The HistoƌǇ of the CoŶĐept͛, iŶ C. 
Fijnaut and L. Paoli (Eds.) Organised Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control 
Policies in the European Union and Beyond, Dordrecht, Springer. 
Pease, K. ;ϭϵϵϰͿ ͚Cƌiŵe PƌeǀeŶtioŶ͛, iŶ M. Maguƌie, ‘. MoƌgaŶ aŶd ‘. ‘eiŶeƌ ;Eds.Ϳ The 
Oxford Handbook of Criminology, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Potter, G. (1994) Criminal Organizations. Vice, Racketeering and Politics in an American City, 
Prospect Heights, Waveland. 
Reuter, P. (1983) Disorganised Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand, Cambridge, MIT 
Press. 
RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) (2013) ͚OƌgaŶised Cƌiŵe͛, at: 
https://rusi.org/projects/organised-crime 
‘U“I ;‘oǇal UŶited “eƌǀiĐes IŶstituteͿ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ͚AssessiŶg the Thƌeat of OƌgaŶised Cƌiŵe: The 
Fiƌst NatioŶal “tƌategiĐ AssessŵeŶt͛, ‘U“I AŶalǇsis, 23.05.14 at: 
https://rusi.org/commentary/assessing-threat-organised-crime-first-national-strategic-
assessment 
Sayer, A. (1992) Method in Social Science: A realist approach, 2nd Ed., London, Routledge. 
Sayer, A. (2000) Realism and Social Science, London, Sage. 
24 
 
“heptǇĐki, J. ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ͚Gloďal laǁ eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt as a pƌoteĐtioŶ ƌaĐket: soŵe sĐeptiĐal Ŷotes oŶ 
transnational organised crime as aŶ oďjeĐt of gloďal goǀeƌŶaŶĐe͛, iŶ A. Edǁaƌds aŶd P. 
Gill (Eds.) Transnational Organized Crime: Perspectives on Global Security, London, 
Routledge. 
“ŵith, D., Jƌ. ;ϭϵϵϭͿ ͚WiĐkeƌshaŵ to “utheƌlaŶd to KatzeŶďaĐk. EǀolǀiŶg aŶ ͞OffiĐial͟ 
DefiŶitioŶ foƌ OƌgaŶised Cƌiŵe͛, Crime, Law and Social Change, 16/2: 138-42. 
SOCTA (2013) European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2013, The 
Hague, Europol. 
TƌeŵďlaǇ, P., TaloŶ, B. aŶd HuƌleǇ, D. ;ϮϬϬϭͿ ͚Bodyswitching and Related Adaptations in the 
‘esale of “toleŶ VehiĐles: “Đƌipt ElaďoƌatioŶs aŶd Aggƌegate Cƌiŵe LeaƌŶiŶg Cuƌǀes͛, 
British Journal of Criminology, 41: 561-579. 
UNODC (2004) United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocols Thereto, Vienna, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
United States Senate (1951) Third Interim Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 
Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce (Kefauver Committee), Washington DC, United 
States Government Printing Office. 
SOCA (2006) The United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Serious Organised Crime, 2006/7, 
London, Serious Organised Crime Agency. 
ǀaŶ DuǇŶe, P. aŶd VaŶdeƌ BekeŶ, T. ;ϮϬϬϵͿ ͚The iŶĐaŶtatioŶs of the EU oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe 
poliĐǇ ŵakiŶg͛, Crime, Law and Social Change, 51: 261-281. 
VaŶdeƌ BekeŶ, T. aŶd Veƌfaillie, K. ;ϮϬϭϬͿ ͚AssessiŶg EuƌopeaŶ futuƌes iŶ aŶ age of ƌefleǆiǀe 
seĐuƌitǇ͛, Policing and Society, 20/2: 187-203. 
Wall, D. aŶd Laƌge, J. ;ϮϬϭϬͿ ͚Jailhouse FƌoĐks: LoĐatiŶg the PuďliĐ IŶteƌest in Policing 
CouŶteƌfeit LuǆuƌǇ FashioŶ Goods͛, British Journal of Criminology, 50: 1094-1116. 
Woodiǁiss, M. ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ͚TƌaŶsŶatioŶal oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe: the gloďal ƌeaĐh of aŶ AŵeƌiĐaŶ 
ĐoŶĐept͛, iŶ A. Edǁaƌds aŶd P. Gill ;Eds.Ϳ Transnational Organized Crime: Perspectives on 
Global Security, London, Routledge. 
Woodiǁiss, M. aŶd Hoďďs, D. ;ϮϬϬϵͿ ͚OƌgaŶized Eǀil aŶd the AtlaŶtiĐ AlliaŶĐe: Moƌal PaŶiĐs 
aŶd the ‘hetoƌiĐ of OƌgaŶized Cƌiŵe PoliĐiŶg iŶ AŵeƌiĐa aŶd BƌitaiŶ͛, British journal of 
Criminology, 49/1: 106-128. 
 
